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Abstract
In his paper “Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap” (published in the 
Journal of Moral Philosophy), Jiafeng Zhu argues that the principle of fair play cannot 
require submission to the rules of a cooperative scheme, and that when such submis-
sion is required, the requirement is grounded in consent. I propose a better argument 
for the claim that fair play requires submission to the rules than the one Zhu considers. 
I also argue that Zhu’s attribution of consent to people commonly thought to be bound 
to follow the rules by a duty of fair play is implausible.
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Jiafeng Zhu argues in his paper “Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justifica-
tory Gap” that fair play theorists have moved too quickly from a commitment 
to play fair to a requirement of submission to the rules.1 Though Zhu admits 
that the principle of fair play may generate a duty for beneficiaries of a coop-
erative scheme to reciprocate to its participants in some way, he claims that it 
cannot bind beneficiaries to repay specifically by cooperating—i.e. following 
the scheme’s rules. The intuitive appeal of the principle of fair play is that it 
requires free-riders to restore “the just distribution of benefits and burdens.”2 
But as Zhu points out, it seems that a just distribution could be restored in any 
 I am grateful to Thomas Christiano for discussion of a previous draft, and to an anonymous 
referee for this journal for comments.
1 Jiafeng Zhu, “Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap,” Journal of Moral Phi-
losophy 12, no. 3 (2015): 290–312.
2 David Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 164.
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number of ways, and it is not obvious why considerations of fair play should 
require cooperation as the method of repayment.
Zhu’s argument could have important implications. If the principle of fair 
play cannot bridge the justificatory gap between reciprocity and cooperation, 
then its usefulness in addressing practical problems is significantly diminished. 
The principle has long been thought to provide the most promising grounds 
for political obligation—i.e. a general duty to obey the law. But if Zhu is right, 
then although we may have duties of fair play to reciprocate somehow for the 
benefits that states provide to us as subjects, we need not respond specifically 
by obeying the law. So unless the principle of fair play can bridge the justifica-
tory gap, it is not well suited to ground an account of political obligation.
Fortunately, bridging the justificatory gap is not as difficult a challenge as 
Zhu claims. I respond below to what I take to be his two main arguments. First, 
I offer a stronger argument for the requirement of cooperation than the one 
Zhu considers on behalf of fair play. And second, I respond to Zhu’s claim that 
consent is what grounds a requirement to follow the rules in cases that some 
take to be clear applications of the principle of fair play.
1 Why Follow the Rules?
Zhu’s argument for the justificatory gap relies on an appeal to intuition: it 
seems that there are many forms of reciprocation that could provide a fair 
return for benefits produced by the cooperative efforts of others. So long as 
the return is fair, Zhu says, it does not matter what form it takes. The bur-
den of the fair play theorist is to explain why some loose form of reciproca-
tion is not a sufficiently fair return, and that cooperation—submission to the 
rules—is. Put in terms of rights, the issue is whether incurring a duty of fair 
play involves forfeiting a liberty right to choose how one repays one’s debt of 
fairness.
The standard argument from fair play theorists is that giving up the liberty 
right to repay as one chooses is part of the cost paid by the scheme’s other 
participants, and so those with outstanding debts of fairness must take on 
that cost, too. This alone cannot settle the issue, of course, because Zhu could 
simply reply that an alternative fair repayment would take into account—and 
provide compensation for—the extra benefit of choosing the form of repay-
ment. So there will have to be some further reason to cooperate rather than 
reciprocate if the justificatory gap is to be avoided.
Zhu considers one possible reply on behalf of requiring cooperation: if every-
one were free to choose the form of their reciprocation, then any  cooperative 
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scheme would inevitably collapse. Freely chosen reciprocation would, then, 
fail to restore the just distribution of benefits and burdens. Thus, fair play re-
quires cooperation, rather than freely chosen reciprocation.3 Call this the ac-
tual consequences argument.
As I read Zhu, he offers two replies to this argument. First is that the ac-
tual consequences argument cannot ground a requirement of cooperation, 
because cooperative schemes generally do not depend on support from those 
bound only by a duty of fair play. I will address this claim in the second sec-
tion, as it is part of an independently interesting point. Zhu’s second reply is 
to charge the actual consequences argument with begging the question. The 
consequences of freely reciprocating rather than cooperating are no fault of 
those bound by the principle of fair play unless fair play requires cooperation. 
But that is precisely what this argument is supposed to show.4
Fortunately, there is a better alternative in the neighborhood of the actual 
consequences argument. Free-riding is morally problematic not because of the 
actual costs it might impose on cooperators, but because it is disrespectful. So 
call this the argument from disrespect. Beneficiaries of rule-based coopera-
tive schemes enjoy the same benefits as cooperators. Those who free-ride on 
such schemes treat cooperators disrespectfully, as they enjoy the benefits that 
come from others following the rules while refusing to submit to those rules 
themselves. Free-riders thus claim for themselves a status that is greater than 
equal to cooperators. Put in Kantian terms, the maxim of a free-rider is to enjoy 
benefits without following the rules that make possible the provision of those 
benefits.5 That, of course, is a contradiction in conception, as universalizing 
the maxim makes it a non-viable means to the end of enjoying the scheme’s 
benefits.6 The same is true of the maxim of free reciprocators. If everyone re-
ciprocated as it pleased them rather than submitting to the rules, the scheme 
would collapse. The failure of both the free-rider’s and free reciprocator’s max-
ims to pass the contradiction in conception test reveals that accepting the 
scheme’s benefits without submitting to its rules violates a perfect duty, owed 
to the cooperating members of the scheme. This seems to me a much stronger 
3 Zhu, “Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap,” 306–309.
4 Ibid., 309.
5 The point is clearest when free-riders go out of their way to accept benefits, but I think the 
point holds even for non-voluntarist versions of fair play. Unfortunately, going into the de-
tails here would take us too far afield for too long.
6 Here I make use of the practical contradiction interpretation of the contradiction in concep-
tion test. See Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 92–93.
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argument for the conclusion that non-cooperators wrongfully claim for them-
selves an extra liberty right.7
Another attractive feature of the argument from disrespect is that it avoids 
the following novel argument from Zhu against the actual consequences ar-
gument. If the point of the principle of fair play is to allocate to schemes the 
rights necessary to prevent their collapse, then schemes should have only a 
liberty right to coerce beneficiaries into providing the form of support the 
scheme needs, since that is the only right necessary to ensure the function-
ing of the scheme. The claim right to similar submission is dispensable.8 But 
the argument from disrespect does not call for the allocation of rights with an 
eye to the consequences of different possible allocations. Rather, the argument 
shows through non-consequentialist means that free-riding and free recipro-
cation both violate the claim rights of the other cooperators.
The argument from disrespect is importantly different from the argument 
from actual consequences, as it holds that people must cooperate out of con-
siderations of fair play whether the scheme actually depends on fair play co-
operators or not. And the argument is not question-begging, as it represents 
the fundamental moral concern underlying the principle of fair play just as 
much as it does an explanation of the wrongness of claiming a liberty right to 
reciprocate freely. Thus, one cannot grant that fair play requires some form of 
reciprocity—as Zhu does—without also admitting that the form of that reci-
procity must be submission to the rules.
Fair play theorists have better resources for requiring cooperation than Zhu 
recognizes. But that may be of little import, as Zhu also charges that cases com-
monly thought to raise issues of fair play fall instead under the purview of con-
sent. I turn now to that issue.
7 Incidentally, although Zhu attributes the actual consequences argument to George Klosko, 
I think Klosko has something more like my argument in mind. See The Principle of Fairness 
and Political Obligation, Rev. ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 42. Hart also 
clearly rejects the appeal to actual consequences as the basis of a duty to play fair. Immedi-
ately after stating the principle of fair play, he writes: “In social situations of this sort… the 
obligation to obey the rules is something distinct from whatever other moral reasons there 
may be for obedience in terms of good consequences (e.g., the prevention of suffering); the 
obligation is due to the cooperating members of the society as such and not because they 
are human beings on whom it would be wrong to inflict suffering.” “Are There Any Natural 
Rights?,” Philosophical Review 64, no. 2 (1955): 185. Other common-sense defenses of fair-
ness also explicitly reject the need for additional bad consequences to render unfair rule- 
breaking morally problematic. See Gerald F. Gaus, Social Philosophy (London: M. E. Sharpe, 
1999), 184–85.
8 Zhu, “Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap,” 307–308.
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2 Consent and Fair Play
Both consent and fair play are transactional principles. They account for the 
transfer or creation of rights relationships between persons by appeal to some 
interaction between them. As a result, the two principles have a similar struc-
ture with similar parts. On consent theory, one commits to an agreement by 
the offering of a “sign of consent”—an act that, “because of the  context in 
which the act was performed, including the appropriate conventions (linguis-
tic or otherwise)…counts as an expression of the actor’s intention to consent.”9 
Acceptance of benefits fills this role on the principle of fair play.10 In cases 
where consent is offered, the contract or terms of agreement specify the 
rights transferred between and created for the consenting parties. For fair play 
theorists, the rules of the cooperative scheme specify the relevant rights and 
duties. In other words, the rules stipulate what form fair reciprocation must 
take.
One major appeal of the claim that fairness requires submission to the rules 
is that it offers an attractive explanation of our intuition that in some cases we 
are morally required to submit to a set of rules even when we clearly have not 
consented to those rules. In accepting benefits willingly and knowingly from 
a cooperative scheme, one is at the same time accepting that one is morally 
bound to submit to the rules of that scheme.11 Garrett Cullity describes one 
such case:
Public transport in my town is efficiently run on an “honor” system, 
which places the onus on passengers to buy a ticket before traveling and 
to cancel it in a machine on any vehicle they use. I ride without paying.12
Fair play theorists often cite cases like this as classic instances of free-riding, 
in which a duty of fair play is being violated. Zhu concedes that there is a non-
fungible duty to pay the fare in cases like this, but he denies that fair play is 
the best explanation of that duty. His alternative explanation is that the riders 
9 A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, n.j.: Princeton 
University Press, 1979), 88.
10 I will restrict my remarks in this section to the voluntarist version of fair play, since it is 
the main target of Zhu’s argument about consent.
11 For discussion of the willing and knowing conditions, see Simmons, Moral Principles and 
Political Obligations, 129; Edward Song, “Acceptance, Fairness, and Political Obligation,” 
Legal Theory 18, no. 2 (2012): 212–15.
12 Garrett Cullity, “Moral Free Riding,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 24, no. 1 (1995): 6.
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tacitly consent to pay the fare by—as the case specifies—riding without pay-
ing. Zhu writes that just as one tacitly consents to pay for a meal in a restau-
rant by ordering, Cullity’s free-rider tacitly consents to pay the transit fare by 
 boarding.13 If there were a ticket seller blocking the entrance to the vehicle, rid-
ers would expressly consent by paying; under the honor system, riders tacitly 
consent to pay by boarding the vehicle. Zhu writes that using the honor system 
instead of a ticket seller “does not change the nature of the public transport 
scheme; it only makes the system more open, and changes the way people pay 
their fares.”14 Thus, Zhu concludes, the best explanation is that the free-rider 
violates a tacit agreement by failing to pay.
Zhu’s explanation is implausible. One offers tacit consent by remaining 
silent or inactive in cases where doing so is a sign in the given context that 
one consents.15 For the behavior of the passenger in Cullity’s public transport 
case to qualify as tacit consent, there would have to be a convention accord-
ing to which it is a reliable sign that one consents to pay (and follow any other 
relevant rules) by walking past the ticket purchasing station and boarding a 
vehicle without paying. But, of course, there could be no more reliable sign 
that one does not consent to pay. If Cullity’s passenger tacitly consents, one 
wonders what a person would need to do to avoid signaling consent.16
The principle of fair play, on the other hand, explains cases like this easily. 
Cullity’s free-rider accepts the benefits of the public transit system without 
submitting to the rule that he must pay the fare. He becomes a member of 
the cooperative scheme of riders by accepting the benefits. Yet he refuses to 
submit to the rules of the scheme, and so claims a greater liberty for himself 
than that enjoyed by the other members. Submitting to the rules by paying to 
ride is the only way he can play fair with his fellow passengers. Unless he pays, 
he violates a duty of fair play to them. It seems, then, that Zhu has mistaken 
what John Simmons calls a “consent-implying act” with a genuine sign of con-
sent, for boarding without paying does not signal that the free-rider intends to 
consent.17
13 Zhu, “Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap,” 299–302. See n13 and the 
accompanying main body text.
14 Ibid., 301.
15 For this reason, ordering in a restaurant is an example of express consent, not tacit con-
sent. For a helpful discussion of the conditions for tacit consent, see Simmons, Moral 
Principles and Political Obligations, 80–83.
16 If signs of consent were this easy to come by, one would think that the problem of politi-
cal obligation could be disposed of rather quickly.
17 One of Simmons’ examples of a consent-implying act is apropos: “An act may be such 
that it binds the actor morally to the same performance to which he would be bound if 
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There are, of course, cases in which one does conventionally signal consent 
by accepting benefits. In these cases, consent is a fine explanation of the du-
ties that arise.18 But the existence of such cases is of no help to Zhu, for two 
reasons. First, acceptance is not always a sign of consent, and when it is not 
there are still sometimes clear duties to follow the rules. For Zhu to avoid this 
problem, he would have to show that acceptance always signifies consent in 
the relevant cases, or that there are some other grounds for the duty in these 
cases besides fair play. But the public transport case is one clear example in 
which acceptance is not a sign of consent, benefits are accepted, and fair play 
is a strong candidate explanation for the relevant duty.19
Second, even if consent can explain our intuition that a person is under a 
duty in some case, that duty could have multiple grounds. One could be bound 
to fulfill the duty both because one agreed to do so, and as a matter of fair play. 
To see how this is possible, take a case involving another kind of special duty. 
Suppose that my mother is sick. I have an associative duty to her to provide for 
her care. But suppose further that I once promised my father that I would take 
care of my mother should the need arise. There is no good reason of simplic-
ity to declare one of these grounds invalid. In fact, in this case the multiple 
grounds illuminate the fact that I owe the relevant action to different people 
for different reasons. The same could be true of some private variant of the 
public transit case. I may offer my consent to follow the rules of the bus (pay 
my fare, no eating or smoking, etc.) to the bus company and also owe the same 
thing to my fellow passengers as a matter of fair play.
Fair play sometimes offers a better explanation than does consent for a duty 
to follow the rules. The public transit case is a representative example. Thus, 
the theoretical utility of fair play cannot be so easily replaced. And even if it 
could, fair play might still be an additional grounds for a particular duty to 
cooperate.
he had in fact consented. I may do something which is not itself an act of consent, but 
which nonetheless binds me as if I had consented.” Simmons, Moral Principles and Politi-
cal Obligations, 89.
18 The serving conventions at some restaurants are one example, as Zhu points out. Zhu, 
“Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap,” 300.
19 Zhu could insist that I have misunderstood the conventions of the honor system in the 
public transit case, but again, that would not help him. For even if he has in mind a 
strange scenario in which skirting payment is a sign of consent to pay, there are obviously 
cases in which acceptance of benefits and signaling consent come apart. Suppose, for 
example, that Jones free-rides in a differently configured public transit system by hopping 
the turnstiles. He accepts the benefits of the system while offering a clear sign that he 
does not consent to pay.
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Zhu poses a novel objection to the principle of fair play by pushing a point that 
has gone largely unremarked upon. Although the justificatory gap could make 
trouble for some fair play theorists, I think that a well-developed principle of 
fair play can successfully defend against Zhu’s arguments.
